

FILED  
SUPREME COURT  
STATE OF WASHINGTON  
4/20/2023 4:25 PM  
BY ERIN L. LENNON  
CLERK

No. 101925-4

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
STATE OF WASHINGTON

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STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

vs.

JEFFREY J. LEPLEY,

Petitioner

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APPEAL FROM DIVISION II  
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
#56531-5-II

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PETITION FOR REVIEW

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## Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	2
I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER.....	3
II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION .....	3
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....	3
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....	4
A. Procedural History.....	4
B. Facts .....	4
V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED .....	8
VI. CONCLUSION .....	19
VII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .....	20

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Cases

<i>State v. Alexander</i> , 64 Wn.App. 147, 822 P.2d 1250 (1990) .....	11
<i>State v. Baeza</i> , 100 Wn.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983) .....	9
<i>State v. Colquitt</i> , 133 Wn.App. 789, 137 P.3d 892 (2006) .....	10
<i>State v. Gallagher</i> , 112 Wn.App. 601, 612, 51 P.3d 100 (2002) .....	10
<i>State v. Green</i> , 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) .....	10
<i>State v. Huber</i> , 129 Wn.App. 499, 119 P.3d 388 (2005) .....	16, 17, 18
<i>State v. Hummel</i> , 196 Wn.App. 329, 383 P.3d 592 (2016) .....	9, 10, 11
<i>State v. Hutton</i> , 7 Wn.App. 726, 502 P.2d 1037 (1972) .....	12
<i>State v. Vasquez</i> , 178 Wn.2d 1, 309 P.3d 318 (2013) .....	11, 12
<i>State v. Weisberg</i> , 65 Wn.App. 721, 724, 829 P.2d 252 (1992) .....	10, 11

### Statutes

RCW 46.61.502 .....	9, 14
RCW 46.61.520 .....	8

### Rules

RAP 13.4 .....	8
WPIC 90.06 .....	13

**I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER**

Jeffrey J. Lepley, petitioner, respectfully requests that this Court accept review of the Court of Appeals decision in case number 56531-5-II terminating review designated in Part II of this petition.

**II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION**

Mr. Lepley respectfully requests that this Court review the Court of Appeals decision, affirming the jury's verdict in this case. The Court of Appeals erroneously determined that sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's guilty verdict that Mr. Lepley committed vehicular homicide while driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

A copy of the decision from the Court of Appeals, Division II, terminating review which was filed on March 21, 2023 is attached as Exhibit "A".

**III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the jury's verdict that sufficient evidence existed to convict Mr. Lepley of vehicular homicide when insufficient evidence existed to prove,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Lepley drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol?

#### **IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

##### **A. Procedural History**

On or about August 10, 2020, the State charged Mr. Jeffrey Joel Lepley with one count of vehicular homicide for an event that occurred on or about July 14, 2019. CP 1-2. On October 19, 2021, after a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Lepley guilty of vehicular homicide. RP 1-178.

On December 3, 2021, the trial court rejected defendant's motion for an exceptional sentence below the standard range and sentenced Mr. Lepley to the high end of the range, 102 months. RP 47-53. CP 61-73. On December 20, 2021, Mr. Lepley filed his notice of appeal and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on March 21, 2023. This Petition for Review follows.

##### **B. Facts**

On the early afternoon of July 14, 2019, Douglas Chantry and his wife were working in their garage when they heard a vehicle drive past them heading eastbound on Pioneer Way in Pierce County, Washington. RP 16-17. The vehicle was driving fast enough to get his

attention. RP 17. After hearing the vehicle go by, Mr. Chantry heard the squeal of tires and then three consecutive crashes. RP 17. Mr. Chantry and his wife went to the area, looked into the farm field across the street and noticed a car upside down. RP 18. Mr. Chantry noticed a female in the passenger seat and another person in the driver's seat. RP 19. Mr. Chantry acknowledged that travelling faster than the posted speed on this road was nothing unusual or out of the ordinary. RP 21. Rather, that rate of travel was consistent for that road. RP 21.

Firefighters/EMT's were dispatched to the scene and upon arrival, the EMT's noticed two individuals in the vehicle. RP 25. When the EMTs approached the driver, they did not detect any odor of alcohol about his person. RP 26. Not until the person was loaded into the ambulance did they detect an odor of alcohol. RP 26, 99.

Travis Hoffman, a Pierce County Sheriff's Deputy with over 40 years of experience, also responded to the scene. RP 29-30, 32. When Deputy Hoffman arrived, he recalled one occupant, Mr. Lepley, in the vehicle. RP 33, 37. Deputy Hoffman asked Mr. Lepley if he had been drinking, which he acknowledged. Importantly, however, Deputy Hoffman did not notice any odor of alcohol about Mr. Lepley. RP 39.

Although Deputy Hoffman arrived at the scene at about 2:30 p.m., the blood draw conducted on Mr. Lepley did not occur until 3 ½ hours after he arrived. RP 43.

In addition to Deputy Hoffman, Deputy Powers from the Pierce County Sheriff's Department responded to analyze and document the accident scene. RP 45-47. Although Deputy Powers took photographs and measurements in order to perform a speed analysis, he was not able to make a speed calculation because of insufficient information. RP 56.

Madison Fuller, a forensic scientist with the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Lab, received laboratory samples identified as blood belonging to the defendant, Jeff Lepley. RP 103-104; 112. *Exhibit 22*. After evaluating the samples, a report came back that the blood alcohol content was .19 gms per 100 ml of blood within the sample. RP 115-116. *Exhibit 21*. Significantly, the blood tubes cite Mr. Lepley's date of birth as 07/14/1970. *Exhibit 22*. Mr. Lepley's actual date of birth is February 27, 1970. CP 1.

Aside from the purported results from the blood test, Ms. Fuller did not know anything about Mr. Lepley such as his weight, how much he had to drink, when he started drinking, when he stopped

drinking, whether he drank on an empty stomach, or the alcohol burn off rate. RP 123-124. Ms. Fuller acknowledged that multiple variables go into an individual's absorption rate of alcohol, which can affect a blood test result. RP 125. Further, at the time of the event, Ms. Fuller could not determine, with any scientific certainty, what Mr. Lepley's blood alcohol content was at the time of driving as Ms. Fuller had no information about how much alcohol Mr. Lepley consumed. RP 126, 131. Ms. Fuller also acknowledged that the odor of alcohol about a person, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish that an individual was under the influence of alcohol. RP 132.

Jeff Lepley was employed as a commercial painter for 23 years and had been married to Patricia Lepley for 24 years. RP 136-137. Mr. Lepley was familiar with the area where the accident occurred as he drove this route daily. RP 138-139. On the morning of July 14, 2019, Mr. Lepley and his wife went to breakfast at a local brunch. RP 140. Mr. Lepley had some mimosas, which came in a mixture poured by the wait staff by way of a pitcher. RP 141. Although Mr. Lepley drank, his glass was not empty before it was refilled. *Id.* Mr. Lepley recalls being at breakfast for 2 ½ hours and at no time was he ever



refused service of the mimosas. RP 142. Further, at no point in time did Mr. Lepley feel like he was under the influence of alcohol. *Id.*

After leaving the restaurant, Mr. Lepley and his wife went to a local museum, where they stayed for a couple of hours and watched a movie. RP 142-144. After watching the movie at the museum, the next thing Mr. Lepley recalled was waking up in the hospital. RP 144. He had no idea how he arrived nor did he know what had occurred. At no point did Mr. Lepley believe he was under the influence of alcohol. RP 144.

**V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED**

Mr. Lepley respectfully requests that this Court accept review of this case as it involves a constitutional question regarding the sufficiency of evidence to affirm a conviction for vehicular homicide when insufficient evidence exists to prove intoxication. RAP 13.4(3).

*A. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE.*

As this Court is aware, vehicular homicide is set forth in RCW 46.61.520(1)(a) as follows:

- (1) When the death of any person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury proximately

caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person, the driver is guilty of vehicular homicide if the driver was operating a motor vehicle:

(a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502.

RCW 46.61.502 states as follows:

(1) A person is guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, cannabis, or any drug if the person drives a vehicle within this state:

(a) And the person has, within two hours after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as shown by analysis of the person's breath or blood made under RCW 46.61.506; . . .

As set forth below, the State presented insufficient evidence to support Mr. Lepley's conviction under this alternative of the vehicular homicide statute. As such, this Court should grant his petition, reverse his conviction, and dismiss the charge.

Due process requires the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Baeza*, 100 Wn.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983). It protects an accused against a conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element necessary to constitute the crime charged. *State v. Hummel*, 196 Wn.App. 329, 333, 383 P.3d 592 (2016). As it is a question of constitutional law, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed *de novo*. 100 Wn.App. at 333. As stated in *Hummel*:

This inquiry impinges on the discretion of the fact finder to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law and focuses on whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Where sufficient evidence does not support conviction, such a conviction cannot constitutionally stand.

*Id.*(citations omitted).

When challenging the sufficiency of evidence, this Court must determine:

Whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

*State v. Weisberg*, 65 Wn.App. 721, 724, 829 P.2d 252 (1992). *See also State v. Green*, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980); *State v. Gallagher*, 112 Wn.App. 601, 612, 51 P.3d 100 (2002) (citations omitted). "A defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence." 112 Wn.App. at 613 (citations omitted). Importantly, however, "the existence of a fact cannot rest upon guess, speculation, or conjecture. *State v. Colquitt*, 133 Wn.App 789, 796, 137 P.3d 892 (2006) (*citing State v. Hutton*, 7

Wash.App. 726, 728, 502 P.2d 1037(1972). *See also State v. Vasquez*, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013). The courts have not hesitated to reverse convictions where the evidence supporting the conviction requires one to speculate or guess as to the proof of the elements. *See Hummel, supra; Vasquez, supra; State v. Alexander*, 64 Wn.App. 147, 822 P.2d 1250 (1990).

In *Alexander*, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction because the alleged victim's testimony was so filled with inconsistencies that the jury could not possibly have found the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. In that case, the alleged victim directly contradicted herself about whether an incident ever occurred. *Alexander*, 64 Wn.App. at 589. Her testimony also was contradicted by her mother's testimony as it related to the time frames she was in contact with the alleged abuser. *Id.* As such, *Alexander* applies to appellant's case.

In *Weisberg, supra*, Division II of the Court of Appeals reversed a jury's conviction when the state produced insufficient evidence of forcible compulsion in a rape case. There, testimony failed to establish that the defendant either suggested or threatened harm to the alleged victim if she did not comply with his request to

engage in sexual intercourse. Based upon the evidence, which the court presumed to be true, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt.

Similarly, this Court reversed the defendant's conviction in *Vasquez, supra*, when the proof of the element of intent to injure in a fraud case was based on nothing more than "rank speculation". *Vasquez*, 178 Wn.2d at 16. *See also State v. Hutton*, 7 Wn.App. 726, 502 P.2d 1037 (1972)(reversing defendant's convictions where no expert testimony presented to support identity of the controlled substance).

As set forth above, insufficient evidence exists to support Mr. Lepley's conviction. As the Court is aware from the recitation of the facts, this was a single car accident, but no speed analysis could be calculated because of insufficient data. All that is known is that the car appeared to be travelling at a rate higher than the posted speed limit, which was not unusual for this area. Mr. Lepley, who was familiar with the road, had no recollection of the accident and was not able to report what had occurred.

What is known, however, is that Mr. Lepley went to brunch with his wife, he had something to drink, but the exact amount is

unknown. No credible, admissible evidence exists, however, to establish that he was driving the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Responding law enforcement personnel provided varying descriptions of whether they noted an alcohol odor emanating from Mr. Lepley. The range went from not noting any odor of alcohol to noting an odor of alcohol once Mr. Lepley was placed in the ambulance. In essence, insufficient and inconclusive evidence existed to establish that he was under the influence of alcohol. As this Court is aware, “it is not unlawful for a person to consume intoxicating liquor and drive a motor vehicle.” WPIC 90.06. CP 26.

Additionally, no testimony was elicited from any witness that Mr. Lepley’s ability to drive a vehicle was “lessened in any appreciable degree as a result of intoxicating liquor.” CP 41. The slight odor of intoxicants, which was inconsistently testified to during the trial, is not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lepley’s driving was “lessened in any appreciable degree as a result of intoxicating liquor.” As such, the evidence presented does not satisfy the due process concerns set forth above.

Even the blood analysis performed by forensic scientist Madison Fuller is faulty. As testified to by Deputy Hoffman, the blood draw did not occur until over 3 ½ hours after the accident. For purposes of driving under the influence, a person is under the influence if his or her blood alcohol level is in excess of .08 within two hours of driving. *See* RCW 46.61.502(1)(a).

Here, the blood draw did not occur within two hours of driving and the content of alcohol in Mr. Lepley's blood at the time of the accident is unknown, if in fact Mr. Lepley's blood was analyzed. In order to try to overcome this hurdle, Ms. Fuller sought to conduct retrograde extrapolation for purposes of quantifying Mr. Lepley's blood alcohol. By her own admission, however, Ms. Fuller testified that she didn't know anything about Mr. Lepley and how alcohol might affect him personally. Accordingly, and based upon insufficient evidence to present to the jury, no reasonable jury could reach its verdict that Mr. Lepley was under the influence of alcohol at the time he was driving.

*1. The Blood Draw Evidence is Inconsistent.*

The blood draw evidence was introduced at trial in Exhibits 21 and 22: a photograph of the blood tubes, and the analysis document.



Significantly, introduction of these exhibits does not save the State's case.

As set forth within the charging document, Mr. Lepley's date of birth is February 27, 1970. CP 1-2. The blood tubes exhibit reference to Mr. Lepley's date of birth is inconsistent with respect to Mr. Lepley's birthdate. Such error creates a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the blood results obtained as well as whether the blood in the tubes is Mr. Lepley's blood.

*B. MR. LEPLEY DID NOT WAIVE ALL CHALLENGES TO THE BLOOD EVIDENCE.*

The Court of Appeals' decision suggests that Mr. Lepley's stipulation regarding proof of the blood draw protocol equates to the actual results of the blood draw analysis as related to Mr. Lepley, the individual on trial. Such analysis is erroneous.

Without question, the parties stipulated that the foundation for the blood draw protocols were followed as set forth within the Stipulation Regarding Blood Draw. CP 103-106. The actual blood evidence, however, is set forth at Exhibits 21 and 22.



It is not the foundation that petitioner contests. Rather, it is evidence that was introduced at trial at Exhibits 21 and 22 that fails, as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Jeff Lepley on trial is the same person charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The blood vial exhibits reference Lepley's date of birth as July 14, 1970. This birth date is inconsistent as when compared to Lepley's birthdate as set forth in the charging document: February 27, 1970. Compare Exhibits 21 and 22 with CP 1-2. Notwithstanding the foundational stipulation, there is nothing that establishes, within the stipulation, that the Mr. Lepley who appeared at trial is the Mr. Lepley charged in the information. No evidence was introduced by the state to establish a Mr. Lepley's date of birth as set forth within the charging document. As such, this inconsistent evidence does not support a finding that the blood results are accurate as related to the Jeff Lepley who sat at trial. *See State v. Huber*, 129 Wn.App. 499, 119 P.3d 388 (2005).

In *Huber*, the issue in the bail jump case was whether evidence was sufficient to show that the person on trial was the same person who had earlier failed to appear in court. At trial, the prosecutor introduced certified copies of an information charging Huber with a violation of a protection order and other documentary evidence to support its case. The State did not call any witnesses or otherwise attempt to show that the exhibits were related to the same Wayne Huber who was then before the court. *Huber*, 119 P.3d at 389.

In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that although the State produced documents in the name of “Wayne Huber”, there was no evidence to show “ that the person named therein was the person named in trial”. *Id.* at 390-391. Because no other evidence established that the person on trial was the person named in the State’s exhibits, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to dismiss the bail jumping charge with prejudice. *Id.* at 391.

Here, the same situation exists. Although the State admitted blood evidence, there was no evidence to establish that the blood evidence of “Jeff Lepley” was from the same “Jeff

Lepley” who sat at trial as the State failed to present any evidence of a “Jeff Lepley” date of birth that was consistent with the admitted blood evidence. Under such circumstances, per *Huber*, insufficient evidence exists to support a finding that Mr. Lepley is, in fact, the person who had a blood result in excess of the legal limit.

1. *Invited Error*

The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Mr. Lepley invited error into his case. As the Court of Appeals properly noted:

The invited error doctrine ‘prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.’” *State v. Ellison*, 172 Wn.App. 710, 715, 291 P.3d 921 (2013)(quoting *State v. Pam*, 101 Wn2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984), *overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson*, 126 Wn.2d 315, 321, 893 P.3d 629 (1995)). This doctrine prevents a party from stipulating to a fact at trial and then challenging it on appeal. *Id.* at 716.

Here, Mr. Lepley is not challenging a fact stipulated to at trial. The facts stipulated to at trial was that the foundational requirements for admitting the blood test were met. He did not stipulate that he was the individual from which the blood was

drawn. As such, the Invited Error Doctrine does not apply and the Court of Appeals decision to the contrary is erroneous.

Insufficient evidence existed to support a conviction of vehicular homicide while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Further, Mr. Lepley did not waive a challenge to the blood draw evidence by simply stipulating that the foundation was established nor did he invite error in this case. The State was still required to match the person at trial with the blood evidence admitted. Respectfully, the State failed to do so. As such, this Court should accept his petition for reviewing, reverse his conviction and dismiss the charge against him.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

Based on the arguments, records and files contained herein, Mr. Lepley respectfully requests that this Court accept review of this matter.


**VII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

This document contains 3,711 words.

Respectfully submitted this 20<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2023.

HESTER LAW GROUP, INC.,  
Attorneys for Petitioner

By:



\_\_\_\_\_  
BRETT A. PURTZER  
WSB #17283

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the day below set forth, I caused a true and correct copy of this brief to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

Counsel for Respondent

Kristie Barham  
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- Hand Delivery
- ABC-Legal  
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Appellant

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- Hand Delivery
- ABC-Legal  
Messengers
- Email

Signed at Tacoma, Washington, this 20<sup>th</sup> day of April,  
2023.

/s/ Lee Ann Mathews  
LEE ANN MATHEWS

COPY TO CLIENT  
FOR YOUR INFORMATION  
DATE: 3/20/23

Filed  
Washington State  
Court of Appeals  
Division Two

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON March 21, 2023

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,  
  
Respondent,  
  
v.  
  
JEFFREY J. LEPLEY,  
  
Appellant.

No. 56531-5-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

GLASGOW, C.J.—After drinking several mimosas over brunch, Jeffrey Lepley crashed his car with his wife in the passenger seat, killing her. The State charged Lepley with vehicular homicide.

At trial, the State offered evidence that Lepley’s blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit within two hours of the crash. Even though Lepley’s blood was drawn more than two hours after the accident, an expert used retrograde extrapolation to calculate Lepley’s blood alcohol concentration within two hours of the accident. The jury convicted Lepley and the trial court imposed a sentence at the high end of the standard sentencing range.

Lepley appeals, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him. He contends in part that the State did not adequately establish his blood alcohol concentration within two hours of the accident and that there was insufficient evidence to prove the blood drawn was his blood. He also argues that the trial court erred by declining to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard sentencing range. We affirm Lepley’s conviction. We decline to review Lepley’s sentence because it was within the standard sentencing range.





## FACTS

### A. Background

One morning, Lepley and Trisha, his wife, drove to a restaurant for brunch. They arrived a little after 10:00 a.m. and stayed for two to two-and-a-half hours. While they ate, they drank mimosas. During the meal, waiters repeatedly refilled patrons' glasses with a mimosa mixture. After having brunch, Lepley and Trisha went to a wooden boat museum. They stayed for an hour-and-a-half to two hours.

At around 2:30 p.m. that afternoon, a man was washing a motorcycle in front of his garage when a car drove by "fast enough to get [his] attention." Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Oct. 13, 2021) at 17. He then heard the "squeal of a tire and three consecutive crashes." *Id.*

The man went to investigate the crash and saw a car upside down in a farm field. When he approached the car, he saw a woman in the passenger seat and "the head of a [short-haired] person" in the driver's seat. *Id.* at 19. The man tried to elicit a response from the people in the car, but he was unsuccessful. An officer then arrived at the scene.

Chester Johnston, a firefighter and emergency medical technician, was dispatched to the collision. He approached the car and helped get Lepley out. Trisha was also removed from the car, but she was pronounced dead at the scene.

Johnston helped load Lepley into an ambulance. Travis Hoffman, a Sheriff's Deputy, spoke with Lepley. Lepley "was laying on his back on the gurney" and had "an injury to his ear." *Id.* at 38. Hoffman asked Lepley what had happened and Lepley said he did not remember. Hoffman then asked Lepley if he had been drinking and Lepley responded affirmatively.



Johnston rode with Lepley to a hospital and detected the smell of alcohol on him. Jason Harris, who was also a firefighter and emergency medical technician, rode with Lepley as well and noticed alcohol on Lepley's breath.

Later, Hoffman spoke with Lepley at the hospital. Hoffman did not notice the smell of alcohol at that time. After he obtained a warrant, Hoffman read it to Lepley and provided him with copies. A lab technician subsequently collected samples of Lepley's blood. The technician drew the blood at 5:52 p.m., about three-and-a-half hours after the collision. The blood test showed that at the time the blood was drawn, Lepley's blood alcohol concentration was 0.19 g per 100 mL.

The State charged Lepley with vehicular homicide under RCW 46.61.520(1)(a). A person commits vehicular homicide where their driving proximately causes another person's injury, that person's death is "a proximate result" of the injury, and "the driver was operating a motor vehicle" while "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." RCW 46.61.520(1)(a).

B. Trial

Lepley's case proceeded to a jury trial. Witnesses testified consistent with the facts stated above. When Hoffman testified, he identified Lepley as the person he interacted with at the scene of the collision and later at the hospital. After Hoffman testified about the blood draw, the State successfully moved to admit a picture of the blood vials into evidence. Lepley's birth date as listed on the vials was different from his birth date as listed in the information charging him with vehicular homicide.

Regarding the blood draw, the parties stipulated that a lab technician "extracted the defendant's blood," mixed "vials of the defendant's blood," and "handed the blood tubes back to" Hoffman. Suppl. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 104. The parties also stipulated that Lepley would not be

able to “contest the foundational requirements” of the blood draw. *Id.* The trial court read the following to the jury: “On July 19, 2019, at approximately 5:52 p.m., [a lab technician] was qualified to perform a legal blood draw and followed the required procedures and protocol when she collected samples of blood from Mr. Jeffrey Joel Lepley at Tacoma General Hospital at the request of Deputy Travis Hoffman.” VRP (Oct. 18, 2021) at 95.

Scott Powers, a collision reconstructionist with the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department, also testified. The trial court certified him as “an expert in the field of reconstruction.” VRP (Oct. 13, 2021) at 51. Powers said he was called to the crash. He said he was not “able to conduct any speed calculations as part of [his] investigation,” but the vehicle traveled more than 300 feet, which was “not consistent with doing the speed limit.” *Id.* at 56, 64. He added that he “was not able to determine why the vehicle ultimately lost control, but it appeared the vehicle lost control as it was coming into a curve.” *Id.* at 57. He testified that the vehicle “overcorrected,” “slid counterclockwise almost broadside all the way to” a guardrail, hit the guardrail, and rolled down an embankment. *Id.* at 58. Later, technical collision investigator, Nate Condrey, testified that there was “significant damage to the guardrail.” *Id.* at 74. “It had been folded back,” and several “of the supports had been knocked out.” *Id.*

A forensic scientist with the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory, Madison Fuller, testified about the analysis of Lepley’s blood. The trial court certified her as “an expert in the field of chemistry and blood analysis.” VRP (Oct. 18, 2021) at 112. First, Fuller said that after testing Lepley’s blood, she found that the blood alcohol concentration was 0.19. Next, she learned from the State that the time of the collision was approximately 2:30 p.m. and the time of the blood draw was approximately 5:52 p.m., about three-and-a-half hours later. Then, using that

information, she made a calculation on the stand and testified that Lepley's blood alcohol concentration was approximately 0.21 two hours after the collision. She used retrograde extrapolation to make the calculation, explaining that retrograde extrapolation allows her to estimate someone's blood alcohol concentration level "at a time prior to the blood draw." *Id.* at 118. She testified that the "elimination rate of alcohol is linear and constant," so "it can vary, but . . . the average human eliminates .015 grams of alcohol per hour." *Id.* at 119.

When defense counsel cross-examined Fuller, she confirmed that she did not know any personal details about Lepley, such as his weight, how much he had to drink before the collision, or whether he drank on an empty or full stomach. She also confirmed that the .015 figure is "not specific to the individual who is being tested." *Id.* at 124. Defense counsel asked, "So what you're telling the jury is that you have a guess based on this one principle that you're using regarding retrograde extrapolation?" *Id.* at 126. Fuller replied, "I have a theoretical value, yes." *Id.*

Lepley testified last. He said he drove on the road where the collision occurred almost every day. When asked if he remembered the collision itself, he said the last thing he remembered before waking up in the hospital was watching a movie at the wooden boat museum. When asked if he was under the influence of alcohol at any point that day, he said, "I didn't think so." *Id.* at 144.

The jury found Lepley guilty of vehicular homicide.

C. Sentencing

At Lepley's sentencing hearing, several of Trisha's family members and friends testified about the loss they experienced. At the time of sentencing, Lepley's offender score was zero. The

No. 56531-5-II

State, noting that Lepley's standard range was 78 to 102 months in prison, recommended 102 months.

Lepley's counsel argued that an exceptional downward sentence of 48 months was appropriate. He contended that such a sentence was "fitting within the facts of this case and the loss, not only that Trisha Lepley's family has suffered, but also the loss that Mr. Lepley has suffered and will continue to suffer long after the prison sentence is over." VRP (Dec. 3, 2021) at 33.

The trial court adopted the State's recommendation and imposed a sentence of 102 months in prison. In explaining its reasoning, the trial court noted the seriousness of the offense, the fact that Lepley's blood alcohol concentration level was more than twice the legal limit, the fact that "Lepley was previously convicted of two serious crimes" in California that had since washed out,<sup>1</sup> the fact that Lepley had taken no steps to engage in chemical dependency treatment since his arrest, and the victim impact statements. *Id.* at 41.

Lepley appeals.

## ANALYSIS

### I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

#### A. Standard of Review

"Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *State v. Cardenas-Flores*, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).

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<sup>1</sup> Lepley's judgment and sentence lists only one assault conviction, but the State and the trial court referred to two assault convictions in the State's sentencing memorandum and in the sentencing hearing.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we accept the State's evidence as true and draw "reasonable inferences in the State's favor." *Id.* at 266. We consider direct and circumstantial evidence to be "equally reliable," *id.*, although "the existence of a fact cannot rest upon guess, speculation, or conjecture." *State v. Colquitt*, 133 Wn. App. 789, 796, 137 P.3d 892 (2006). We "defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence." *State v. Thomas*, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

B. Evidence of Driving Under the Influence

Lepley argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that, at the time of the collision, he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Regarding the nature of his driving, he contends that "no speed analysis could be calculated because of insufficient data." Br. of Appellant at 11. Additionally, he points out that "law enforcement personnel provided varying descriptions of whether they noted an alcohol odor emanating from [him]." *Id.* at 12.

Lepley also attacks the blood analysis. He notes that the blood draw did not occur until more than three-and-a-half hours after the crash and argues that Fuller's use of retrograde extrapolation to determine his blood alcohol concentration within two hours of the crash was faulty, given that Fuller "didn't know anything about . . . how alcohol might affect him personally." *Id.* at 13. And Lepley argues that the State did not prove that the blood Fuller analyzed belonged to him. We disagree.

A driver commits vehicular homicide where their driving proximately causes another person's injury, that person's death "ensues within three years as a proximate result" of the injury, and "the driver was operating a motor vehicle" while "under the influence of intoxicating liquor .

... as defined by RCW 46.61.502.” RCW 46.61.520(1)(a). RCW 46.61.502 states that a person drives “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor” if they have “an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as shown by analysis of [their] breath or blood” within two hours after driving or if they drive a vehicle while “affected by intoxicating liquor.”<sup>2</sup> RCW 46.61.502(1)(a), (c). The State can use analyses of blood samples “obtained more than two hours after the alleged driving . . . as evidence that within two hours of the alleged driving, a person had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.” RCW 46.61.502(4)(a). And “in any case in which the analysis shows an alcohol concentration above 0.00,” the State can use the blood sample to show “that a person was under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor.” *Id.*

The Washington Supreme Court has found circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that a person drove under the influence of alcohol. For example, in *State v. Randhawa*, the court held that even without blood draw evidence, there was sufficient evidence “to support a finding by the jury that [the defendant] had consumed intoxicating liquor and that the alcohol had lessened, to an appreciable degree, his ability to drive his automobile.”<sup>3</sup> 133 Wn.2d 67, 75, 941 P.2d 661 (1997). The court reasoned that two Washington State troopers said they smelled alcohol on the defendant and several witnesses, including the defendant himself, testified that the defendant had been drinking before the collision. *Id.* at 74. The court further reasoned that the testimony of an eyewitness and an expert witness “supported a conclusion” that the defendant sped, veered out his lane, and “failed to negotiate a sweeping curve” despite favorable driving conditions. *Id.*

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<sup>2</sup> Lepley was convicted under an older version of the statute. However, the relevant language in the older version and the current version is the same.

<sup>3</sup> Randhawa was convicted under a version of RCW 46.61.520 that recited identical elements of vehicular homicide. Former RCW 46.61.520 (1991).



Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict here. The trial court certified Fuller, who testified about Lepley's blood alcohol concentration, as an expert witness. Lepley did not object. On both direct examination and cross-examination, Fuller consistently described how she used retrograde extrapolation to calculate what Lepley's blood alcohol concentration was within two hours of the collision. We defer to the jury on matters concerning the credibility of witnesses and the persuasiveness of evidence. A rational trier of fact would be entitled to rely on the fact that Lepley's blood alcohol concentration was 0.19 three-and-a-half hours after the crash, more than twice the 0.08 legal limit. A rational trier of fact could also credit Fuller's conclusion that Lepley's blood alcohol concentration was approximately 0.21 two hours after he crashed the car.

As in *Randhawa*, circumstantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Lepley was driving under the influence of alcohol. The morning of the crash, he drank several mimosas at a restaurant over the course of more than two hours. After a movie at a museum, Lepley got into a one-car collision on a road he drove on almost every day. A collision reconstructionist testified that Lepley lost control of the vehicle and overcorrected, causing the vehicle to broadside a guardrail. He also testified that the vehicle traveled more than 300 feet, at some point hitting a guardrail hard enough to make it fold back. After the collision, two firefighters smelled alcohol on Lepley, and Lepley himself said he had been drinking.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lepley drank before he drove and that he had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher within two hours after driving or that the alcohol he consumed influenced his driving.

C. Invited Error

In challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence, Lepley argues that the State did not prove that the blood Fuller analyzed belonged to him. He notes that the birthdate on the blood vials is inconsistent with his actual birthdate and that "such error creates a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the blood results obtained as well as whether the blood in the tubes is [his] blood." Br. of Appellant at 13. We disagree.

"The invited error doctrine 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" *State v. Ellison*, 172 Wn. App. 710, 715, 291 P.3d 921 (2013) (quoting *State v. Pam*, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984), *overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson*, 126 Wn.2d 315, 321, 893 P.2d 629 (1995)). This doctrine prevents a party from stipulating to a fact at trial and then challenging it on appeal. *Id.* at 716. For example, in *Ellison*, we held that where a defendant stipulated to the fact that officers were dispatched to his ex-girlfriend's home in response to a domestic violence call, the invited error doctrine barred him from challenging that fact on appeal. *Id.*

Here, the invited error doctrine prohibits Lepley from challenging the fact that the blood in the vials belonged to him. At trial, Lepley stipulated that the lab technician "followed the required procedures and protocol when she collected samples of blood from Mr. Jeffrey Joel Lepley." VRP (Oct. 18, 2021) at 95; *see also* Suppl. CP at 104. Having stipulated to the fact that the blood was his, the defendant's, Lepley cannot now argue that the blood might have belonged to someone else.

In his reply, Lepley contends that rather than challenging the foundational requirements of the blood draw, he is arguing that the State failed to prove "that the Jeff Lepley on trial is the same person" the State charged. Reply Br. of Appellant at 3. However, we need not address Lepley's



untimely identity defense. “An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.” *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). A party that raises an issue in this manner waives it. *Ives v. Ramsden*, 142 Wn. App. 369, 396, 174 P.3d 1231 (2008); *see also* RAP 10.3(c) (“A reply brief should . . . be limited to a response to the issues in the brief to which the reply brief is directed.”). Lepley did not raise an identity defense below or in his opening brief.

Moreover, the record does not support an identity defense. When Hoffman testified, he identified Lepley as the person he interacted with at the scene of the crash and later at the hospital, where he read Lepley a search warrant for the blood draw. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the person on trial was the person who got in the collision.

We affirm Lepley’s conviction.

## II. REQUEST FOR EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE

Lepley argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a sentence below the standard sentencing range. He argues that a sentence within the standard range is excessively harsh in this case “given the inherent punishment of losing a loved one.” Br. of Appellant at 15. We decline to review Lepley’s appeal of his sentence.

“The trial court has discretion to sentence anywhere within the standard range without providing any reasons in support of its decision.” *State v. Mail*, 65 Wn. App. 295, 297, 828 P.2d 70 (1992); *see also* RCW 9.94A.585(1) (“A sentence within the standard sentence range . . . for an offense shall not be appealed.”). Where “a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range[,] review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to

No. 56531-5-II

exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.” *State v. Garcia-Martinez*, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997).

A court refuses to exercise discretion where it categorically refuses to impose an exceptional sentence “under any circumstances; i.e., it takes the position that it will never impose a sentence below the standard range.” *Id.* A court relies on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence where “it takes the position, for example, that no drug dealer should get an exceptional sentence down or it refuses to consider the request because of the defendant’s race, sex[,] or religion.” *Id.* Conversely, where “a trial court . . . has considered the facts and has concluded that there is no basis for an exceptional sentence,” the defendant may not appeal the court’s exercise of its discretion. *Id.*

Here, Lepley does not allege that the trial court categorically refused to consider his request for an exceptional downward departure from the sentencing range, nor does he argue the trial court denied his request on an improper basis. After considering the facts, the court concluded that there was no basis for imposing an exceptional sentence below the standard range. Lepley may not appeal the standard range sentence the court imposed, and therefore, we decline to review his sentence.

#### CONCLUSION

We affirm the jury’s guilty verdict because the State presented sufficient evidence to support it. Additionally, we decline to review Lepley’s appeal of his standard range sentence.

No. 56531-5-II

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Glasgow, C.J.  
Glasgow, C.J.

I concur:

Cruser, J.  
Cruser, A.C.J.

LEE, J. (concurring) — The parties did not raise the issue of invited error in their briefing; therefore, Jeffrey Lepley’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge should not be decided on the basis of invited error without the parties having had the opportunity to provide this court with their respective positions on the issue. RAP 12.1(a) (“[T]he appellate court will decide a case only on the basis of issues set forth by the parties in their briefs.”); *Wash. Pro. Real Est., LLC v. Young*, 163 Wn. App. 800, 818, n.3, 260 P.3d 991 (2011) (“We will not decide a case on the basis of issues that were not set forth in the parties’ briefs.”), *review denied*, 173 Wn.2d 1017 (2012). To the extent the majority desired to decide this case on invited error, which neither party raised nor briefed, the majority should have allowed the parties the opportunity to present written argument on the issue of invited error. RAP 12.1(b); *State v. Johnson*, 119 Wn.2d 167, 171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992) (“If a party has a meritorious argument, which has not been briefed, that is believed to be necessary to the resolution of the case, . . . we may consider the issue pursuant to RAP 12.1(b).”). Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s reliance on invited error to resolve this appeal.

I agree, however, with the majority that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the person on trial was the person who got into the collision. I also agree with the remainder of the majority’s opinion.

  
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Lee, J.

**HESTER LAW GROUP, INC., P.S.**

**April 20, 2023 - 4:25 PM**

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